Oblivious transfer (OT) is an essential building block for secure multiparty computation when there is no honest majority. In this setting, current protocols for n ≥ 3 parties require each pair of parties to engage in a single OT for each gate in the circuit being evaluated. Since implementing OT typically requires expensive public-key operations (alternatively, expensive setup or physical infrastructure), minimizing the number of OTs is a highly desirable goal.
• If the adversary can corrupt up to t = (1 − )n parties, where > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant, then a total of O(n) OT channels between pairs of parties are necessary and sufficient for general secure computation. Combined with previous protocols for "extending OTs", O(nk) invocations of OT are sufficient for computing arbitrary functions with computational security, where k is a security parameter.
• The above result does not improve over the previous state of the art in the important case where t = n − 1, when the number of parties is small, or in the information-theoretic setting. For these cases, we show that an arbitrary function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} * can be securely computed by a protocol which makes use of a single OT (of strings) between each pair of parties. This result is tight in the sense that at least one OT between each pair of parties is necessary in these cases. A major disadvantage of this protocol is that its communication complexity grows exponentially with n. We present natural classes of functions f for which this exponential overhead can be avoided.
Introduction
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) [50, 25, 7, 11] provides a powerful and general tool for distributing computational tasks between mutually distrusting parties without compromising the privacy of their inputs. We consider the problem of secure computation in the case where a majority of the parties can be corrupted. In this case, secure computation of nontrivial functions implies the existence of oblivious transfer (OT) [48, 44, 19 ] -a secure two-party protocol which allows a receiver to select one of two strings held by a sender and learn this string (but not the other) without revealing its selection. Moreover, OT can be used as a building block for general MPC protocols that tolerate an arbitrary number of corrupted parties [51, 26, 24, 36, 23] . These protocols involve a large number of OT invocations which typically constitute their efficiency bottleneck. Indeed, standard implementations of OT require expensive publickey operations, whereas alternative "information-theoretic" implementations of OT require either a trusted setup [3] or physical infrastructure [15] and may be viewed as being at least as expensive. Thus, minimizing the number of OTs in MPC protocols is a highly desirable goal.
How many OTs are needed to secure the world? In a world consisting of just two parties, this question was essentially answered by Beaver [4] (see also [34] ). In a pure information-theoretic setting, ignoring computational efficiency issues, computing a two-argument function whose shorter input has length generally requires Θ( ) OTs. (Some specific functions require fewer OTs; see [17, 5] for a more refined study of the "OT complexity" of information-theoretic secure two-party computation.) Quite remarkably, it is possible to do much better if computational security is required. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, a "seed" of k OTs, where k is a security parameter, can be used for implementing an arbitrary polynomial number of OTs. 1 This implies that k OTs are sufficient for secure two-party computation of arbitrary functions, even ones whose input length is much bigger than k. Given Beaver's result, it is natural to expect that k OTs would be sufficient for computationally secure MPC protocols involving an arbitrary number of parties. Unfortunately, known protocols are very far from achieving this goal. Beaver's OT extension technique crucially relies on the fact that the number of OTs required by Yao's two-party protocol [50] is equal to the length of the shorter input. No similar protocols are known for n ≥ 3 parties. To make things worse, the number of OT invocations in current protocols (e.g., [24, 23] ) does not only depend on the length of the inputs but also on the complexity of the function f being computed. Specifically, these protocols require each pair of parties to invoke an OT protocol for each gate of a circuit computing f . 2 In the computational setting it is possible to apply Beaver's OT extension protocol between each pair of parties, requiring only k OTs for each of the n 2 pairs. Thus, the state of the art prior to the current work can be summarized as follows:
• In the information-theoretic setting, the number of OTs needed by n parties to compute a circuit of size s is O(n 2 s).
• In the computational setting (assuming one-way functions exist) the total number of OTs is O(n 2 k).
The above state of affairs leaves much to be desired and gives rise to several natural questions: Can one reduce the quadratic dependence on the number of parties while maintaining security against a dishonest majority? Can the dependence on the circuit size in the information-theoretic case and the dependence on the security parameter in the computational case be eliminated?
Our Contribution
setting. For these cases, we show that an arbitrary function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} * can be securely computed by a protocol which makes use of a single OT between each pair of parties. We also show that this result is tight, in the sense that when t = n − 1 at least one OT between each pair of parties is necessary. At a high level, the protocol proceeds by n − 1 iterations, where in the end of the i-th iteration the first i + 1 parties hold additive shares of the truth table of f (x 1 , . . . , x i , ·, . . . , ·), namely f restricted by the inputs of the first i parties. A major disadvantage of this protocol is that its communication complexity grows exponentially with n. We present natural classes of functions f for which this exponential overhead can be avoided. These include sparse polynomials, decision trees, deterministic and nondeterministic finite automata, and CNF and DNF formulas, which capture useful secure computation tasks (cf. [2] ). Some of these efficient protocols rely on expander-based constructions of extractors for bit-fixing sources [35] .
In the case where each party holds an -bit input (rather than a 1-bit input) the above upper and lower bounds on the number of OTs grow by a factor of , whereas the bounds on the number of OT channels remain unchanged.
Preliminaries and Definitions

Some basic notations
Throughout the paper we use the following notation: By P 1 , . . . , P n we denote the n parties, the security threshold t is the maximal number of parties that the adversary can corrupt, and k stands for a security parameter when considering computational or statistical security.
Oblivious Transfer (OT)
A central building block of secure computation protocols is the Oblivious Transfer (OT) primitive. OT refers to several equivalent versions of two-party protocols. Originally introduced by Rabin [44] is the version known as Noisy-OT. In this paper, by OT we refer to the 2 1 -OT due to Even, Goldreich and Lempel [19] (which was shown to be equivalent to Noisy-OT in [14] ). This is a two-party protocol where initially Bob has two secret strings s 0 , s 1 and Alice has a choice bit c. At the end of the protocol, Alice learns s c but learns nothing about s 1−c , while Bob learns nothing about Alice's choice; i.e., OT is a secure protocol for the functionality f OT (c; s 0 , s 1 ) = (s c , ⊥). All of our results can be cast in the OT-hybrid model, namely in a network in which pairs of parties can invoke an ideal OT functionality.
Secure Multiparty Computation: Models and Settings
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a general framework that captures many cryptographic tasks. Loosely speaking, it is a protocol for n parties each holding a local input x i . The goal of the parties is to jointly compute a function f over their inputs so that the parties learn the output of f but nothing more than that. In particular, they only learn about the other inputs whatever they can infer from the output of f and their local input.
Our model for secure multiparty computation follows standard definitions from the literature [10, 23] . The availability of an OT primitive is captured by considering an OT-hybrid model, in which each pair of parties can invoke an ideal OT oracle. By a t-secure protocol for f we refer by default to a protocol which is perfectly secure in the semi-honest model against an adversary that may adaptively corrupt at most t parties. Perfect security will sometimes be relaxed to statistical or computational security.
Below we outline some specific details of the default MPC model we consider.
• Inputs and outputs: For simplicity, we assume that there are n parties, each holding a single input bit. Thus, f is a function over n bits. The case where the parties hold -bit inputs is usually a simple generalization (unless stated otherwise). Typically, in this case the number of OTs will grow by a factor of .
Without loss of generality, we assume that a single designated party (say P 1 ) gets the output f (x) while the other parties get no output. Such a protocol can be easily used for a more general setting in which all parties get outputs. We use this convention for simplicity.
• Secure channels: Communication between every pair of parties is carried over secure channels where only the two communicating parties have access to the messages sent over the channel. A secure channels infrastructure can be achieved without the use of OT calls (once more, it is essential to make this observation when the number of OTs used is the focus). In the computational setting, secure channels are achieved using symmetric encryption which only requires one-way functions. In the information theoretic setting, secure channels can be achieved by using one-time pads (whereas OT cannot be achieved altogether without specialized hardware or trusted parties). Note that the upper bounds in Sections 4 and 5 do not make use of secure channels. All lower bounds, on the other hand, apply even if secure channels are available.
• Adversaries: We allow an adversary to corrupt up to n − 1 of the parties and still require that the lone honest party remain secure. For some applications, this requirement is too harsh and we allow the adversary to control up to t parties, for n/2 ≤ t < n. (The case of t < n/2 is irrelevant to our discussion since, in this setting, secure computation can be achieved without OT at all [7, 11] ). Moreover, we allow the adversary to choose the parties that he wishes to corrupt adaptively throughout the execution of the protocol. We note that the issue of adaptivity is most crucial when t < (1 − ε)n, for a constant ε > 0. In such a case, it is easy to fool a non-adaptive adversary simply by choosing a small random committee and doing all of the work within this committee (thus reducing the number of parties substantially). If the adversary is adaptive, then this approach fails and a more careful approach is needed (see, for example, Section 3.1).
• Semi-honest parties: The semi-honest (or honest-but-curious) model assumes that the parties follow the prescribed protocol and only try to infer extra information from their records. In the computational setting, this model is justified by the existence of a generic compiler based on zero-knowledge proofs [25] that given a protocol secure against semi-honest parties generates a protocol secure against malicious parties. It should be noted that this compilation requires lesser assumptions than OT protocols and can be carried out using commitment schemes (or equivalently one-way functions) rather than OTs. This is of importance when counting the number of OT invocations as we do here. ≈ {Y s }) if for every polynomial-size circuit family M n , every polynomial q(·), all sufficiently large n, and all s ∈ S ∩ {0, 1} n we have:
Secure
The actual definition. We refer the reader to [10, 23] for full definitions and, instead, give here a definition only for the model that interests us (described above). The definition follows the ideal-real paradigm that states that a protocol is secure if whatever can be achieved in the real world may be achieved in an ideal world as well.
Real world: At the beginning of the execution of protocol Π, each party P i holds an input bit x i . The parties toss random coins and send messages to each other (according to the prescribed protocol and over secure channels). At each point in the protocol, the adversary may choose to add a party P i to its set I of corrupted parties (as long as |I| ≤ t). In this case, the party P i sends its entire view to the adversary. The view consists of the input x i , the random coins of P i and all of the messages that P i received in the protocol. Denote by VIEW Π i (x) the view of party P i in the protocol Π with input x. For a set I, define VIEW Π I (x) as the union of the different views of the parties in I. We denote the set that the adversary corrupts as a function of the execution by I Π(x) (note that this is a random variable).
Ideal world:
In the ideal world, all parties send their local inputs to a trusted party who in turn sends f (x) to the designated party. The adversary can choose the corrupted set I adaptively (in each step observing an input x i and according to it choosing the next party to corrupt). Thus, the adversary has an algorithm I(x) for choosing the corrupted set. The outputs received by the adversary are denoted f I(x) (x) (typically, as mentioned, for one designated party it is f (x) and for the rest it is empty). 
Counting OT Channels: Upper and Lower Bounds
A closely related question to the number of required OT calls is the number of required OT channels in a network. That is, given a network of n parties, we look at a graph where each node stands for a party and an edge stands for the ability to run an OT between two parties. On each such edge, we assume the ability to execute arbitrarily many OT calls. In addition, there exist private communication channels between every pair of parties. The question is how many OT channels are needed in order to simulate a full network of OTs (a network in which every two parties can execute an OT functionality).
More precisely, define the n party OT function f OT as a function that takes inputs from two parties (if more than two parties provide inputs then the function outputs an abort symbol). The first party inputs two string s 0 , s 1 and the second inputs a bit c. The output s c is received by the second party. The question at hand is how many OT channels are required for the network to be able to securely compute the function f OT .
OT Channels: Static vs. Dynamic. When discussing OT channels, special care needs to be taken when modelling the network. The simpler case is when the network is static, i.e., the OT channels are set in advance and known to the adversary (this case is suitable for an implementation of OTs based on some physical infrastructure). A stronger model (for the honest parties) allows a dynamic network, in which the parties may set the OT channels as part of the protocol (while trying to hide this information from the adversary). Our upper bounds do not take advantage of the dynamic setting and work also in the static setting. We prove our lower bounds initially in the static case and then extend them to the dynamic case.
OT Channels and Counting OTs. Counting OT channels is an interesting question in its own right, and may directly capture the case where OTs are implemented via some physical infrastructure (e.g., noisy pointto-point channels). Moreover, its connection to the number of OT calls needed for secure computation is two fold:
• As means of achieving upper bounds on the number of OT calls in a computational setting. In the two-party computational setting, it is known how to achieve a polynomial number of OT calls at the price of just k calls [4, 34] (where k is the security parameter). Therefore, if we only need, say, O(n) OT channels, then we can simulate the whole network at the price of O(nk) OT calls, which is better than the trivial upper bound of n 2 k OT calls.
• As a mechanism for proving lower bounds on the number of OT calls (see Theorem 3.6). Namely, the minimal number of channels needed to securely compute the functionality f OT is in particular a lower bound on the number of OT calls necessary.
We note that the function f OT is just a single example of a function for which the lower bounds hold; a similar lower bound holds for any function that is complete for n-party computation, in the sense that it can be used as an oracle for computing arbitrary functions t-securely. A sufficient condition for completeness is that for every pair of inputs, one of the two-party criteria from [37, 6, 31] is met for some restriction of the other inputs.
Upper bounds for t = (1 − δ)n: The Committees Method
We turn to the case that t = (1 − δ)n (we mostly think of δ as a constant fraction, but the discussion is not restricted to this case). Consider the following strategy: from the n parties choose m committees, each of size d, where a party can (and will) participate in several different committees. Assume that each committee has a full network of OT channels between them. Using each committee we generate a candidate for an OT protocol between party A and party B as follows: The sender and receiver additively share their inputs (s 0 , s 1 and c respectively) between all committee members. The committee members now run a secure computation protocol that computes a random additive sharing of s c between the committee members (this is done using their OT channels and the "GMW protocol" [24] ). Now each committee member sends his share of s c to the receiver B who reconstructs the output. This constitutes a secure OT protocol as long as not all of the committee has been corrupted (if all of the committee is corrupted then there is no security at all). In total, for each of the m committees we have a candidate for an OT protocol, which is secure if not all of the underlying committee is corrupted. It is known how one can combine OT candidates protocols to a single secure OT protocol as long as a majority of the candidates are secure. This method is called an ( , m)-robust combiner for OT and its existence was pointed out in [30] (and [40] ) based on amplification techniques from [16, 49] . For our application we need to use the combiners of [43] or [29] that can also handle adaptive corruption of the candidates.
Our goal is therefore to solve the following combinatorial problem: find a collection of "small" committees such that every adversary, corrupting at most t = (1 − δ)n of the parties, covers less than half of the committees. A simple probabilistic argument shows that such collections exist and moreover a random collection whose size depends only on δ (and not on n) is a good solution with high probability.
An Explicit Construction. We next give an explicit choice of committees that satisfies the above requirements. Consider a bipartite graph with m vertices on the left (the committees) and n vertices on the right (the parties). Every committee has d edges connecting it to all the parties it consists of (that is, the graph is d-regular on its left side). The requirement for the committees protocol to be secure is that every set of m/2 vertices on the left are connected to more than (1 − δ)n vertices on the right. This is exactly the setting of a disperser 5 with very high min-entropy (min-entropy of log(n/2) out of the possible log n). There are several explicit constructions that we can use for this task including Goldreich and Wigderson [27] , Reingold et al. [46] and Gradwohl et al. [28] , all of which have near optimal degree (up to constants with respect to the lower bounds of [45] ). Specifically we can work with d = 1 δ , and m = n + o(n) (or even m = n − o(n) if using the construction of [28] ).
Corollary 3.1 There exists an explicit construction of a network consisting of (n+o(n))
1/δ 2
OT channels such that the network can t-securely compute f OT in the presence of an adversary that corrupts up to t = (1 − δ)n of the parties. Specifically:
• If δ is a constant then the network needs O(n) OT channels.
• As long as δ ≥ 1 √ n , the construction requires strictly less than the n 2 OT channels of the full network.
The above corollary can be combined with OT extension protocols [4, 34] to yield a ((1 − δ)n)-secure protocol for an arbitrary function f that uses a total of O(kn) OTs. This protocol inherits the security and assumptions of the underlying OT extension protocol (see Footnote 3).
Related works using committees. The idea of virtually performing tasks by committees has been used in distributed computing and cryptography. Originating in the work of Bracha [9] in the context of Byzantine agreement, committees have been used in the same context by [8, 12] , for MPC [32] and for leader election [42, 52, 38] . Committees have recently been used by Fitzi et al. [20] to achieve Perfectly Secure Message Transmission (PSMT) in a partial network of secure channels. It should be noted that while the task of PSMT is reminiscent of our question regarding OT channels, there are inherent differences. For example, our committees protocol (above) can effectively achieve an OT call even between two parties that are isolated in the OT graph (not connected by an OT channel to any other party). In PSMT, on the other hand, there is no chance of achieving secure communication with a node that is not connected by any secure channel. 6 On non-adaptive adversaries. In the case that the adversary is non-adaptive but the network is dynamic, one can do much better. In fact, only a single good committee is needed. Indeed, a randomly chosen committee of size k/δ has probability of 1 − 2 −Ω(k) of being good. Note, however, that this simple protocol can be trivially broken by an adaptive adversary who first learns the identity of the committee members and then corrupts all of them.
Lower Bounds for t = n − 1: Full OT Network is Necessary
In this section we look at the strictest security scenario, where the adversary can corrupt all but one of the parties. We show that given an almost full network of OT channels except for one missing channel, it is impossible to complete the network (i.e., securely compute the function f OT ). As a first step we consider a static network with just 3 parties, A,B and C. Claim 3.2 Let A, B and C form a network where C has OT channels with both A and B, but there is no OT channel between A and B. Then, any 2-secure protocol for f OT over this partial network can be used (as a black box) to obtain a two-party OT protocol in the plain model.
Proof:
We transform the given 3-party protocol π 3 into a two-party OT protocol π 2 in two steps: first we eliminate all invocations of the OT oracle, and then we obtain a two-party protocol by letting one of the parties simulate A and the other simulate B and C. These steps are captured by the following two lemmas. The protocol π 3 is obtained from π 3 by implementing each OT call via the trivial protocol in which C sends its input to the other OT participant (either A or B). Note that this trivial OT protocol is perfectly secure against an adversary that corrupts either {A, C} or {B, C}, since the input of C is guaranteed to be known to the adversary.
We can now use π 3 to implement OT between A and B in a 3-party network without OT channels. An important observation is that C has no inputs in this protocol.
Lemma 3.4 Let Π be a protocol between A, B, C that computes a function for which C has no inputs, and
suppose that Π is secure against {A, C} and {B, C}. Then Π is also secure against {A} and {B}.
The lemma follows simply by observing that when C has no input the view of a corrupted A can be simulated using the simulation of {A, C} and likewise for B.
We can now use π 3 to get a two-party OT protocol π 2 by letting one party simulate A and the other party simulate B, C. Due to Lemma 3.4 we get that the protocol is secure against corruption of either party and hence constitutes an OT protocol in the plain model between two parties. We Generalize Claim 3.2 to hold for a dynamic network of n parties (rather than a static 3-party network). If the network is dynamic then A and B are unknown in advance and we do not know how to construct the plain model OT. The strategy for two parties that want to run a plain model OT between themselves is to guess A and B in advance (this will be successful with probability 1/ n 2 ). Using the guess, they construct a plain model OT candidate and execute it with random inputs. The point is that during the protocol the OT channels are determined, and the parties figure out if their guess was successful or not. If the guess was wrong then they start over (no harm was done as they used random inputs). If they were correct, then they have just executed a secure OT protocol in the plain model on random inputs. This execution can then be used in a standard way to execute a fresh OT call. With overwhelming probability, the protocol will succeed within a fixed polynomial number of tries.
As corollaries of the previous lemma, we get the lower bounds that we were seeking for the number of OT invocations: Theorem 3.6 Any n-party protocol Π that (n − 1)-securely computes f OT using less than n 2 OT channels can be used (as a black box) to implement a two-party OT protocol in the plain model. In particular, there is no such Π with perfect or statistical security, and its existence with computational security cannot be based on one-way functions in black-box way.
Lower Bounds for Corruption of t = n − d Parties
We show impossibility results for this case that are based on extremal graph theory and give tight bounds (for different ranges of d). The bounds hold also in the dynamic network model. 
Proof:
The two claims follow the same principle. The crux is that unless every two sets of parties of size d be connected in the OT graph, then one can build an OT in the plain model. Suppose that there exist two disconnected sets of size at least d then define each of the groups as A and B and the rest of the graph as C. We now reduce this setting to the case of the previous section where we have parties A, B and C such that A and B are not connected and the adversary may corrupt either {A, C} or {B, C} (since these are sets of size at most n − d). By Claim 3.2, such a setting would allow building a two-party OT protocol in the plain model.
Proving (1) for the static case. Due to the outline above, we examine graphs where every two sets of size d must contain at least one edge between them. This means, in particular, that in the graph of non-edges there exists no clique of size 2d. By Turan's Theorem, such a graph can have at most (1 − 1/(2d))n 2 /2 non-edges, and hence the OT graph must have at least n 2 4d edges.
Proving (2).
The above argument is limited since it only considers the fact that the non-edges graph must not contain a clique of size 2d. But actually, the graph cannot even contain a bipartite d × d clique which is a stricter constraint. For such a graph there are rather tight results when d is a constant. Namely, for constant d the Erdös-Stone-Simonovits Theorem [18] states that the non-edges graph must have at most o(n 2 ) missing edges, which amounts to the OT graph containing (1 − o(1)) n 2 OT channels. As in Claim 3.5, even if the layout of OT channels is not known in advance it can simply be guessed. Since the number of missing edges is constant, the probability that a random guess is correct about the eventual network is inverse polynomial, which suffices to extend any static network result (with constant d) to a similar result for dynamic networks.
Proving (1) in the dynamic case. We provide an argument that there must be at least n 2 2d edges in the graph (when assuming that every two sets of size d must contain at least one edge between them). This argument provides a slightly better bound than Turan's Theorem (since Turan's theorem discusses anti-cliques rather than bipartite d×d anti-cliques) but, more crucially, gives us information that is useful for proving the bound in the dynamic case.
Take an arbitrary ordering of the vertices in the graph. We define a partitioning of the vertices into In particular this means that A 1 must have at least n − 2d neighbors since otherwise there is a set of d non-neighbors to A 1 . Now we remove A 1 from the graph and follow the same argument for A 2 , finding n − 3d neighbors to A 2 (since we don't count A 1 any more). This is repeated for every A i , implying that the total number of edges in the graph is at least
2d . Even more so, this argument provides a guarantee that if there are less than n 2 2d edges in the graph then in every partition of the graph to set of size d, at least one of the sets has no neighbor with some other set of size d (the other set is not necessarily in the partition).
We use this information to construct a two-party OT in the plain model from a secure protocol for f OT in the dynamic setting. Since the network is not known in advance, our goal is to efficiently find sets A, B and C where A and B are of size d and have no connecting edges in the dynamically set network. The strategy is to pick a random set of size d and set it as A. Then the protocol is executed in the network in which the OT channels are established. Every vertex that is required to invoke an OT call with a party in A is put in the set C. The remaining vertices are put in the set B. We claim that this strategy for choosing A, B and C is successful with probability at least d n (by successful we mean that A and B have at least d vertices and are not connected by OT channels). This follows directly from the guarantee above, since a random set of size d is part of a partition, and at least one of the sets in every partition is a potential choice for set the A (there exists a matching set B for this A). Since the random choice of A is done independently from the execution of the network then with probability d n we choose a good candidate for set A. The above strategy gives rise to an adaptive process that transforms an (n − d)-secure computation Π of f OT in a network with less than n 2 2d dynamically chosen OT channels into an OT protocol in the plain model. The process described next actually computes an OT on random inputs, which can later be used (by a standard argument) to execute a fresh OT on new inputs.
OT on random inputs.
1. Sender and receiver choose random inputs for an OT protocol.
2. The two parties choose a random set A and the sender simulates all of A while the receiver simulates the rest of the parties. In addition another random vertex b ∈ A is chosen that is given the inputs of the receiver (the sender gives his inputs to one vertex in A).
3. The parties simulate the protocol Π for evaluating f OT , and every time a party simulated by the receiver wants to establish an OT channel with A then this party is considered part of C and runs a naïve OT instead (simply sends his input in the clear to the other side). 7 4. If at the end of the simulation |C| > n − d or if b ∈ C then the parties declare failure and return to step 1.
5. Otherwise, the parties have executed an OT protocol on random inputs.
We first notice that by the above arguments on the strategy of choosing A, B and C, then the protocol ends with success in an expected number of n 2 d iterations (probability d n for a good choice of A and probability at least 1 n for a good choice on b). Also when this succeeds then the parties indeed compute an OT functionality (by the properties of f OT ). It remains to prove that this protocol is secure.
For this, we first show an that there is an efficient adversarial procedure for corrupting either {A, C} or {B, C} as defined in the above strategy. The procedure chooses the random set A. If adversary chooses to corrupt {B, C} then he does this according to his knowledge of A (no matter what happens in the dynamic network). If the adversary wishes to corrupt {A, C} then he initially corrupts the set A. Now the protocol Π is executed and every time a party wants to establish an OT channel with A then this party is also corrupted. The adversary can identify these parties as he controls all of the set A. At the end of the process the adversary has corrupted exactly the sets {A, C} as long as indeed |B| ≥ d. Note that in corrupting {A, C} the adversary must use his adaptive capabilities and indeed the lower bound does not hold for passive adversaries (see end of Section 3.1). As a corollary we get that protocol Π is secure also against an adversary corrupting either {A, C} or {B, C} (this follows since by the security of Π there is a simulation for the view of every specific efficient adversarial strategy of corruption). Now we can apply Claim 3.2 that states that the simulated protocol (with the OT calls replaced by naïve ones) is a secure two-party OT protocol in the plain model.
Upper Bounds for the Case of t = n − 1
The Tables Method
The tables method is a generic secure computation protocol that computes a function by an iterative process on the truth table of the function. The truth table of a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is simply a 2 n m bit long string such that the i th cell (or entry) contains the value f (x) where x is the string representing the integer i. Denote the bits of the string x by x 1 , . . . , x n . The idea is to use the fact that restricting the value of the variable x 1 to be either 0 or 1 amounts to looking either at the first or at the second half of the table. Denote by T f the truth table of f and by T f | b the new table when fixing the first input variable x 1 to b, for b ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, T f | 0 is simply the first half of the table T f while the second half is T f | 1 . 8 Similarly, denote the table of f after fixing the j most significant bits of
n → {0, 1} m be a function to be computed by n parties P 1 , . . . , P n , each holding a single input bit x 1 , . . . , x n respectively.
• Initialization stage: P 1 computes T f | x1 , i.e. the truth table of f when restricted to his input
• Iteration stage: The following steps are repeated sequentially for each j ∈ [n − 1]. At the beginning of the j th iteration, each of the parties P 1 , . . . , P j holds a share S i ; x j+1 ) with P i as sender and P j+1 as receiver.
For each
• Output stage: Each party sends its share S The idea of the protocol is that at the j th iteration the j parties P 1 , . . . , P j jointly distribute additive shares of the table T f | x 1 ,...,x j between themselves. At the end of the protocol all parties hold a share of the table T f | x 1 ,...,xn which consists simply of the single value f (x). The full protocol TABLES is presented in Figure 1 . Note that the protocol can be easily generalized to handle -bit inputs rather than single bits. In such a case, each party runs consecutive iterations, one for each input bit. The number of OTs between each pair of players grows to .
Proof:
Correctness. It suffices to see that, at the end of each iteration, the parties indeed hold a sharing of the table T f | x 1 ,...,x j+1 . In particular, in the last iteration the sharing is of T f | x 1 ,...,xn which is simply f (x). This is shown by induction: In the initial stage P 1 holds a single share to T f | x 1 by definition. Now, in each iteration the first j parties start out with shares to T f | x 1 ,...,x j . Since restricting a variable is simply looking at one half of the table, then this operation may be done separately on each of the additive shares (since sharing works by bitwise XOR). Thus, the new sharing in step (3) sums up to T f | x 1 ,...,x j+1 , as required.
Security.
Note that the following proof holds also in the case of adaptive adversaries. The objective is to simulate the view of an adversary given just the inputs {x i } i∈I and perhaps the output f (x) (if the party P 1 is in the corrupted set). This simulation simply runs the protocol from the point of view of the parties in I. The adversary can generate all messages between parties in I, but does not know how to generate messages received from parties not in I. Whenever it expects to receive such a message during the iteration stage, it simply replaces it with a random message. To show that this is indistinguishable from the real view, consider all possible messages in the protocol. The only messages in the protocol (other than the output stage) are in step (2) in which the acting party P j+1 (corrupted) receives a masked table T x j+1 i from P i (not corrupted). Since this table is masked by an unknown random value, then replacing it with a random table yields the exact distribution as the real message (any random message is consistent with exactly one choice of randomness by P i ). Note that here the indistinguishability relies on the fact that the receiver in the OT learns nothing about the other secret (this would give some information on the mask R i ) and therefore the security in such a scheme inherits the security of the OT protocol (computational/statistical/perfect).
Finally, if P 1 is corrupted then the messages in the output stage may be simulated simply by giving random messages subject to the fact that their sum equals f (x).
Applying the Tables Method
The advantage of the tables method is that it requires exactly one OT call between each pair of parties (overall, n 2 OT calls) and presents a plausibility result for (n − 1)-secure computation of any function on n bits, matching the lower bound on the number of OTs for the case of t = n − 1 (Theorem 3.6).
The main problem with the tables method, however, is that the strings sent in the (string) OT are of length 2 n m. This makes the protocol inefficient except when the input domain of f is of feasible size. In the following we show that for certain classes of functions one can get efficient protocols that still require a minimal number of OTs. For example, we describe how to securely compute any function in NC 0 , namely a function in which each bit of the output depends on a constant number of input bits. Note that, under standard cryptographic assumptions, there exist non-trivial cryptographic primitives such as one-way functions and pseudorandom generators in NC 0 [1] .
Proposition 4.2 For every function f ∈ NC
0 there exists an efficient (n − 1)-secure computation protocol using just n 2 OT calls.
Proof sketch: For a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m in NC 0 it is guaranteed that each output bit is a function of c = O(1) input bits. We call these the c input bits that affect the output bit.
The straightforward protocol runs m separate TABLES protocols, one for each output bit. Since each output bit is affected by only c parties, then each TABLES protocol can be executed only by the c parties that affect this output, using a table of size 2 c which is constant. However, if each protocol is run separately then the number of OT calls would grow to c 2 m, which may be bigger than n 2 when m is large. Using a careful scheduling of the TABLES protocols (see Figure 2) , all OT calls between each pair of parties can be computed using a single OT invocation. Thus, the overall number of OTs remains n 2 , matching the lower bound.
Note that the above schedule works for every function f (not necessarily in NC 0 ). The efficiency though is only guaranteed for limited types of functions. More precisely, efficiency is guaranteed for every function where each output bit is affected only by a logarithmic number of input variables.
Extension to bounded degree polynomials. A straightforward extension of the above proposition follows from observing that if the output stage is not executed then the above protocol efficiently computes an additive secret-sharing for each output bit. At the same cost, the parties can get an additive secret-sharing of the sum of various outputs. This is done simply by each party taking a local sum of the various shares Scheduling of TABLES executions for f ∈ NC 0 .
For j = 1 to n
• For all f k affected by j, if j is the smallest index that affects f k then run initialization stage of TABLES f k .
• For all f k affected by j, if j is the largest index that affects f k then run output stage of TABLES f k with all participants in f k .
• For i = 1 to j -If there exists an f k that is affected by both j and i run an OT protocol between receiver P i with choice bit x i and sender P j with inputs that are a concatenation of the strings according to TABLES f k , for every f k affected by both i and j.
• For every f k affected by j, party P j redistributes shares according to TABLES f k to all parties P i that affect f k and i < j. that it holds to create a new share for the sum. This forms an efficient low communication (n − 1)-secure protocol for all logarithmic degree polynomials whose representation as the sum of monomials has only a polynomially many terms.
Oblivious Linear Branching Programs
This section puts forward a generalization of the tables method that extends the class of functions that we can securely compute by an efficient protocol while keeping a low OT-complexity as well. The class of functions that we deal with is a linear algebraic version of oblivious branching programs. 
Proof:
The following protocol (Figure 3 ) securely computes the branching program with the required properties.
As in the tables case, the protocol is easily generalized to work with bit inputs and then requires sn OT calls.
n → {0, 1} m to be computed by parties P 1 , . . . , P n , over their respective input bits x 1 , . . . , x n . Let
) be a linear branching program that computes f .
• Initialization stage:
• Iteration stage: The following steps are repeated sequentially, for each j ∈ [s]. Denote the set I j = {i 1 , . . . , i j } of parties involved in the computation thus far. At the beginning of the j th iteration, for each i ∈ I j the party P i holds a share S j i such that i∈Ij S
j+1 is shared between the parties in I j+1 .
1. For each i ∈ I j , party P i chooses a random mask R i ∈ {0, 1} wj and computes
2. P ij+1 runs an OT protocol with every P i such that i ∈ I j ; specifically, they run the protocol
) with P i as the sender and P ij+1 as the receiver. 3. For each i ∈ I j , party
• Output stage: All parties send their shares S The proofs of correctness and security are similar to that of the TABLES protocol and will not be repeated here. We just note that the correctness hinges on the fact that a linear operation on a vector can instead be applied on each of the additive shares of the vector separately.
Functions Captured by Linear Branching Programs
As mentioned before, the protocol for linear branching programs is a generalization of the tables method. As such, it captures the same applications as the previous method, but it also captures other functions that could not be efficiently computed using the previous method. We highlight some function classes that can be computed using this methodology:
Tables. The LBP model is indeed a generalization as exemplified by the following presentation: consider the initial vector v 0 that is the truth table of the function f . For each iteration, the two matrices M 0 j and M 1 j are simply two projection matrices (and hence also linear operations). M 0 j leaves only the first half of the coordinates while M 1 j leaves the second half of the coordinates. Oblivious counting branching programs. As in the oblivious branching program case, a non-deterministic branching program allows going from one state to a number of states. A counting branching program outputs the number of accepting paths that a non-deterministic branching program has. Such non-determinism can easily be incorporated into LBPs by allowing the state vector to vary from an indicator with a single one. The i th row of the matrix will have a 1 for each possible move from the i th state to the next level. If the operations are executed over a large enough field, then the intermediate vector holds in each location the number of paths that lead up to this state. Thus, over a large field this implements a counting branching program. If working over the field GF (2) then this is simply a parity branching program that indicates the parity of the number of paths that lead to a state. Unfortunately, the most natural non-deterministic model is not captured by LBPs. This is a non-deterministic procedure that asks whether their exists an accepting path to the program at all (an operation that is no longer a linear one). In Section 5, we present protocols for secure computation for this model.
Sparse Polynomials.
LBPs allow for a simple and efficient computation of a monomial over input bits. 9 In addition, an LBP can incorporate in it a number of parallel LBP computations and have the last operation sum their outputs (simply by incorporating this linear operation in the last pair of matrices). Thus LBPs can compute a polynomial as a sum of all of its monomials. For the program to be efficient, the only limitation is that the number of monomials is polynomial. Note that this captures a larger family of functions than in Section 4.2. A closely related question is can one compute a DNF formula using LBPs (DNFs are the OR of monomials rather than their sum). This is a special case of the non-deterministic question addressed in the next section.
Secure Computation for Non-Deterministic LBP
In this section we suggest a method of securely computing a nondeterministic (or existential) linear branching program. As opposed to counting branching programs that give the sum of the number of solutions (and are easy to compute by LBPs), asking whether or not the exists a solution is a non-linear operation and therefore is not captured by the general framework. A good example is the computation of DNF formulas. Like sparse polynomials these are a polynomial size collection of monomials over n input bits but the question is whether x satisfies at least one of the monomials (rather than their sum). The problem arises from the fact that the OR operation is not a linear one and hence it is not captured by the LBP model. A natural approach is to first compute the sum of the monomials over a large enough field (to avoid a wraparound), and then check whether this sum is zero or not. However, revealing the sum is not a good solution as it leaks more information on the inputs than the desired output (it differentiates, for instance, whether there was a single satisfied monomial or many of them). We propose a generic method that securely computes the existential analogue of any counting LBP. The method is secure against adversaries that can corrupt up to t ≤ n − Ω(k) where k is the security parameter, and adds a statistical error of at most 2 −k . For simplicity we state and prove the theorem formally for limited LBPs where each party has a single input bit and note that as in the previous sections, this protocol may be generalized to more complex LBPs, at the price of additional OT invocations.
Theorem 5.1 Let L be a LBP of length n computing a function f : {0, 1} n → Z p where p is a (k/2)-bit prime and k is the security parameter. Then there exists an efficient n-party statistically t-secure protocol with t = n − O(k) for the predicate g defined as:
The protocol requires 4 n 2 OT calls.
Proof:
The basic idea is to add a randomization stage in each of the iterations of the secure computation protocol for L. This randomization should give an output with the following properties: The output should be uniformly distributed over the domain if f (x) = 0 but should always be 0 if f (x) = 0. Therefore, if the output is not 0 then we know for sure that f (x) = 0 but learn nothing else about f (x). If the output is 0, then it is most likely that f (x) = 0. An error only happens if the uniformly distributed output happened to hit 0 which happens with probability that is inverse of the domain size (we will choose the domain to be of size 2 k ).
Cayley expanders and a matrix representation.
For the randomization steps we use a constant degree Cayley expander graph with a specific structure. A Cayley graph is described over a multiplicative group by a small set of generators {G 1 , . . . , G d }. For each element (vertex) v in the group, its neighbors are
We can use any expander graph with a constant degree such that its generators can be represented as affine transformation over Z m p . In particular we can use the expander graph of Margulis [39] and Gaber and Galil [22] . This is an expander over Z N × Z N for some integer N , and we take N to be a prime p in the order of 2 k/2 . The expander has degree 8 and as we required can be presented by 8 affine transformations.
For simplicity we will describe the construction over Z 2 p (as in the Margulis graph) although this can be generalized. Suppose that each step is an affine transformation, e.g. a step moves from vertex v ∈ Z 2 p to the vector Av + e where A ∈ [Z] 2,2 is a 2 × 2 matrix and e ∈ Z 2 p is a vector. For each such generator we define the corresponding 3 × 3 matrix G ∈ [Z] 3,3 as: The randomization technique. Basically, each party in its turn will contribute a random step A i in the expander. Our goal is that at the end of the execution the output will be the multiplication A n . . . A 1 v where v is the vector (0, 0, f (x)). Hence, if f (x) = 0 the output will simply be 0. On the other hand if f (x) = 0 then the output represents the end of a random walk starting at (0, 0). We use the following result of Kamp and Zuckerman [35] , which states that an adversary that does not know Ω(k) of the n expander steps has essentially no knowledge about the outcome of the random walk. The precise statement is that a random walk on a good expander (where each step is represented by a single symbol) is an extractor for a symbol fixing source. 10 . Then conditioned on the view of an adversary that observes at most t elements in the series, the output of the walk is ε-close to uniform.
In our application the graph has parameters d = 8, α ≈ 0.06 (due to [22] ) and the graph is of size 2 k , thus m = k/3. When choosing ε = 2 −k the requirement in the Theorem translates to n − t ≥ Ω(k). Proof: (of Corollary 5.
3) The corollary follows directly from Theorem 5.2 in the case that c = 1. It is left to show that it also holds for any c = 0. This can be seen by breaking the vector v into the sum of c vectors of the type (0, 0, 1). For each of the c vectors the random walk gives an almost uniform distribution. When summing up we have a uniform distribution multiplied by c. Since we are working in Z p then multiplication amounts to a permutation on the elements of Z p and the output remains close to uniform. Note that this is the only place where we require that p is prime.
The actual protocol. The protocol is the same protocol as the general one for computing LBPs only at each iteration, the acting party (that redistributes the shares) chooses a random step in the extractor. The matrix operations of the LBP will always be multiplied from the right, while the random steps of the expander will be multiplied from the left. Technically, the following changes are applied:
• Instead of starting with the vector v 0 of length w 0 , the protocol starts with a matrix B 0 of 3 vectors (B 0 ∈ [Z p ] 3,w 0 ). The first two rows of B 0 are all zero vectors and the third is the vector v 0 . Accordingly, the protocol runs throughout with 3 row matrices rather than single row vectors.
• At step (1) of the iteration stage, rather than computing two values, party P i computes 2d values, two for each generator of the expander. They are for each τ ∈ [d]:
• At step (2) of the iteration, the acting party P i chooses a random τ ∈ [d] and runs a 2d 1 -OT protocol with each party according to his input x j and τ . Such a protocol requires log d + 1 OT calls.
• At the output step, all parties send the first two rows of their shares (but not the third row!) to the designated party P 1 . This party calculates the sum and outputs 0 if the sum was (0, 0) and 1 otherwise.
The correctness and security of the overall protocol follows since the modified LBP protocol forms a n − 1-secure computation for a sharing of the following vector u = A n . . . A 1 B 0 M is simply the vector (0, 0, f (x)). Therefore, combined with corollary 5.3, we get that if P 1 outputs the correct value (up to an error probability of at most 1/p 2 ≤ 2 −k ). Moreover, if f (x) = 0 then an adversary that corrupts up to t parties (including P 1 ) sees a value that is statistically close to uniform, hence leaking no additional information on f (x) or x. This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
